Showing posts with label Foreign Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Foreign Policy. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 14, 2017

Morality and Foreign Policy

Before I write this all out I should say that I am undecided on this topic. It began as reflecting on a series of news items over the last couple of weeks. In the end this may end up as more of a Devil's advocate piece, or just reflect some evolution in my thinking.

In Western democracies we often use sanctions, political or economic, to penalize governments who violate human rights or operate outside of the geopolitical concert. It's a tricky balance riddled with hypocrisy. There are glaring examples of these contradictions, such as Chinese and Cuban relations with the United States.

Countries exist within a spectrum of human rights. The willingness of us to tolerate a government's human rights abuses seems inversely proportional to its economic importance. We make arms deals with Saudi Arabia and trade with increasingly autocratic Turkey, while we help overthrow the government of Libya and sanction Iran.

However our policies can be slow to respond or adapt, especially when European states are involved, or a big economic relationship is in play. Hungary has been going down a troubling path for years now but there is no calls to discipline them.

For decades there have been questions about the effectiveness of these policies. South Korea and China have improved in their human rights and grown their economies as the world has entered and trade increased. Cuba, Iran, and North Korea seem to have become more and more entrenched as the sanctions dragged on. Sanctions hurt the wrong people and enrich the elite.

I'm not suggesting we sell nuclear technology to North Korea or weapons systems to Iran. What I am doing is questioning the utility of broad sanctions. Sanctions and penalties may make sense for regimes that employ slave labour or terribly exploitative worker practices because giving access to our market only encourages these abuses.

The logic of sanctions also raises questions. Cuba and North Korea, as examples, have been under broad sanctions for decades. They have failed to bring down their regimes. Will four more decades improve the situation or condemn generations to poverty and backwardness? Eventually under this logic doesn't regime change become imperative? If forty years of economic hardship is justified isn't the use of force to compel regime change? Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the folly of such interventions, but laying endless economic siege hardly seems worthwhile either. In the case of some countries the sanctions are so strict all that is left is military force for negotiation.

Part of my writing on this was inspired by some of the coverage of President Duterte of the Philippines. The man seems a brutal, awful man, but should we let that define our relationship with the 103 million Filipinos?

To a certain extent, especially in semi-democratic/democratic countries it feels like punishment for their choices. It is a grand scale of election meddling. Say Canada put something in place to sanction Duterte, does the government remove them if a challenger beats him in the next election?

As cold as the calculus is it might be worthwhile to consider the opportunity costs for Canada in these sanctions. What options are being abandoned for a system that has not truly proven to be effective? I know in recent years sanctions have targeted leaders rather than countries. In that instance at least I can see a correlation. However, with over one hundred and ninety countries no blockade is tight, so I think it would be worthwhile to consider our effectiveness and intentions when we call for bans, boycotts, sanctions and penalties on those regimes we find odious.  

Tuesday, October 4, 2016

Book Review: Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda by Roméo Dallaire

For the last six weeks or so I have been working through Roméo Dallaire's account of the Rwandan genocide and civil war. I was a very young child at the time of the genocide, so I do not myself have any memories of the event. Even if I was capable of it I wonder if word of the massacres entered my world. One of the key problems was that the world largely ignored what was happening in the small African country in the Great Lakes region. Did my parents hear on the radio or on the nightly news what was happening on the other side of the world? I do not know when I first learned about Rwanda. I assume it was at school, tied to my learning around the Holocaust and other genocides. Most of my preconceived notions likely (to my embarrassment) to the film Hotel Rwanda and the book Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed by Jared Diamond. Reading this book I came to understand that I knew virtually nothing.




I assume that most people assume the Rwandan genocide was a simple inter-ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. This is a dramatic oversimplification. Rwanda was a Belgian colony. The Belgians elevated one group, the Tutsis, over the Hutus. In the 1950s the Hutu majority pushed for greater political power. Civil unrest broke out, the Tutsi were pushed out of power. Reprisals occurred and the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis fled the country. This led to the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the 1980s. The RPF was a combination of Tutsi and Hutus who opposed the government in Kigali. The situation gets complicated here. In short, the RPF was on the verge of victory. The French backed the government forces, the Belgians were suspected of backing the RPF. The President of Tanzania helped to negotiate a truce and working agreement between the forces which came to be known as the Arusha Accord. The United Nations peacekeeping force was part of the agreement, which is how UNAMIR and Dallaire ended up in Rwanda.

The book opens with Dallaire's personal biography. It explores how a French-Canadian navigated the politics of the Canadian Army. Dallaire comes off as a capable, dedicated, and a problem-solver. In many ways he seemed like an ideal candidate to lead the UN mission. Dallaire entered Rwanda optimistic, naive and enthusiastic, by his own admission. The UN force was undermined from the very beginning. They had insufficient manpower, insufficient resources, and insufficient support from the local elite or the UN Security Council. Reading the early chapters a is a struggle between optimism and dread. As a reader you know where this is building to, but Dallaire lays out numerous scenarios that could have reconciled the factions and averted genocide. The existing government, moderate parties, extremist Hutus, and the RPF could not come to an agreement and establish a coalition interim government. Racist Hutu rhetoric stepped up dramatically during the period of political gridlock.

Dallaire does little to point fingers are particular people or factions. When he does it is more an acknowledge of how failures or stubbornness precluded a peaceful resolution. Growing tensions exploded with the assassination of President Habyarimana of the established government. It seems likely that Habyarimana was killed by hardliners of his own party. His assassination was depicted as a Tutsi plot. Racist Hutu militias (Interahamwe) began targeting and executing moderate politicians. From there the genocide spiraled.

My exceedingly brief description covers about the first third of the book. Dallaire does an excellent job laying out the political and military situation in Rwanda. Though he sometimes slips into excessive acronyms there is a glossary at the back for terms and important figures. The book drips with the tortured life of a man who had to stand by helplessly and oversee the worst genocide of the post-Cold War period. Dallaire shines a gruesome light on the horror of what happened. It does not feel exploitative, but a simple summary of a fraction of the trauma he experienced.

We are still experiencing the fallout of the Rwandan genocide. When western powers did intervene they bungled it and only exacerbated elements of the crisis. Dallaire sees blood on the hands of the United States and France in particular. Shake Hands with the Devil tells a much fuller story than is likely popularly known. This was a troubling and highly informative read. Since I began reading it I have found myself rethinking our attitudes about peacekeeping, Africa and conflict. This book should be mandatory reading for Canadian policymakers, and those interesting in peacekeeping operations.

Tuesday, September 20, 2016

Quick Thoughts: Canada and the United Nations

It has been a long and busy day, so I am keeping things brief tonight.

Well before Prime Minister Trudeau dashed off to New York to speak at the United Nations I have been pondering over Canada’s role within and with the UN. The UN seemed a critical negotiation space and battleground during the Cold War and in its wake the utility of the institution seemed to wane. Often times it feels like the UN is the hindrance to the right thing rather than the catalyst.

I have recently been reading Shake Hands with the Devil about the Rwandan genocide. In so many ways it is testament to the power of the UN and peacekeeping when done effectively. Equally it explores how broken the United Nations is as an institution. There is a fundamental conflict in that those who wish to engage in global affairs must deal with the bureaucratic and troubling UN. I have no idealism invested in that institution, but as a small nation going it alone we hardly could have the kind of impact we could if we worked within the UN’s umbrella. Also, it would not be surprising to learn of squandered manpower and wealth on pointless infighting and waste.


Our current Prime Minister has uttered platitudes suggesting Canada is prepared to engage more actively in the United Nations. At this point I am cautiously optimistic. Canada, and countries of our ilk, cannot hide behind our wealth and security and ignore the world. I hope to have more thoughts on this topic once I finish the book and have more time to explore the idea. 

Tuesday, July 12, 2016

NATO in the 21st Century

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one of the few formal military alliances that remains. Its twin, the Warsaw Pact has long ceased to exist. NATO has dual origins, first it was a more formalized version of the Western Allies. Following World War I alliances took on a more ideological character and the Allies represented "democratic" values. World War II ended American isolationism quite effectively. NATO helped to integrate the Americans into the old Entente, or perhaps better put, it superseded it.

The second reason for NATO was American policymakers' determination to curtail Communist expansion. NATO is a mutual defence organization primarily. Early in its existence states on the frontline of the Cold War, ex. Turkey, joined NATO as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. The hope was to end communist interference and Soviet aggression.

However, history fondly likes to remind us that continuity and change move hand in hand. Russian imperial expansion switched to Soviet communist encroachment and now we're in an age of Russian nationalist-economic aggression.

NATO expanded in to Eastern Europe in the wake of the Cold War's conclusion. In 2007 I may have written that NATO is an outdated institution. A massive political-military alliance against Russia seemed provocative and unnecessary. And then Putin ordered the invasion of Georgia and Ukraine. Suddenly NATO's justification seems much more relevant.

I provide all this context because it was recently reported that Canadian forces were reinforcing the NATO garrisons in the Baltic region. The Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, historically languished under Russian/Soviet oppression. Efforts were made to wipe out their distinct cultures through colonization. With what has happened in Russian areas of Ukraine it is not extreme to think that these countries could be next.

It is certainly moral to defend these small states from the Russian behemoth. Outside of NATO these nations would be utterly defenceless against Russian aggression. It does raise questions though. Would Canadians be willing to go to war over Estonia? The answer, I presume, is no, but it's a question we must now ask ourselves and whether or not we intend to uphold our obligations.

It is easy to dismiss Russia's actions as regional aggression, but it is important to recall that we share a massive territory with the Russians - the Arctic. Canada needs as many friends as it can muster if/when Russia makes military and diplomatic efforts to exert greater control over the region. Canada is a small democratic nation, it has an interest in standing with its peers and smaller sisters. One hopes NATO never has to be called to action. That said, NATO may deserve a serious rethink. Its intervention in Libya suggested perhaps a new future for the alliance, but the Ukrainian conflict suggests that its future may look much more like its past for now.