Wednesday, October 17, 2018

Book Review: The Dictator's Handbook by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith


Every once in a while you're lucky enough to read something that changes the way you look at politics and the world in general. That is how I felt after finished The Dictator's Handbook. Written by political scientists the book is written for a general audience and provides clear examples and demonstrates the central thesis. De Mesquita and Smith seek to uncover the true incentives behind the actions of leaders. Their thesis has given them new insight and understanding of how leaders and governments behave.

The title of the book is a bit misleading. It is not about how to become a dictator, or something like that. The book is focused more on how do leaders gain power and hold power successfully. They argue that leaders in democratic countries, ruthless dictatorships, corporations or small towns are all operating under the same basic principles.




Leaders wish to obtain and maintain power. In any structure where a leader is selected, the authors write, there are the interchangeables, the influentials, and the essentials. The names for these three categories is perhaps the worst part of the book from my point of view. The interchangeables, or nominal selectorate, are the entire population that can choose the leaders. The influentials are the 'real' selectorate, or the group who actually chooses the leader. The essesntials are the group of the influentials who make up the winning coalition.

I know that was a lot to parse, so I'll use an example from Canada. In Canada every adult citizen has the right to vote. That is the interchangeables. However, we know for a fact that a lot of the population does not fall into the category. For example, a significant population of the country does not vote, so you lose about 30-40% right there. From there the leader cobbles together a coalition to win, those become the essentials. This coalition are the voters who elect Members of Parliament for the winning party. In the end only about 15-25% of the Canadian voting population has a role in selecting the Prime Minister. The PM then has the sole duty of keeping that coalition happy in order to maintain power.

America provides an easy example for the presidency. The electoral college is the true real selectorate for the president. He/she must the 270 electoral votes to assure victory. However, in most recent elections some states are absolutely guaranteed in their leanings and the outcome assured. As a result candidates for president can focus on the essentials in a handful of states. In an autocratic regime the selectorate may be the single legal party, like the Communist Party of China, or the support among the military and its key officers.

Once in power leaders have to find a way to reward their supporters to ensure their continued loyalty. Leaders who fail to do so risk encouraging new coalitions forming that will turf them from office. For this control of resources and redistribution is important. The authors have found direct correlation between the size of the coalitions required and the disparity of rewards. In a democracy benefits have to be distributed widely in the form of social programs or tax cuts, as an example. In a dictatorship, or small coalition country, leaders can steal - literally - from the population to reward their backers. This is how you get situations where some small, select minority loyal to the leader, such as his home tribe, becomes enormously enriched. The leader wins their absolute loyalty.

The authors investigate how this lens can interpret things like corruption, taxation and foreign aid. The come to an interesting conclusions and extrapolation, backed by case studies. Countries that have a plentiful resource, like oil, are at greater risk for shrinking the coalition of support. Taxes tend to be higher because regimes in small coalition countries can afford to squeeze their populations more. Foreign aid props up dictators and gives them and their supporters tools to enrich themselves. It's sort of stunning. When developing countries are forced to rely upon their populations to be productive they invest in them and the coalition grows.

The book is deeply cynical, one could argue, but there is an undeniable logic to it. We see these factors play out all the time in democracies as well as dictatorships. The actions of leaders can be explained by these central motivations. The books is well-written as well as dryly humourous. It was a deeply pleasurable read and has definitely given me a lot to think about, and explains why bad behaviour can often be good politics.

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